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J. PULLICINO 
I am glad to have this opportunity to speak on the psychiatric as· 
pects because I feel that I have something to say which needs to 
be said. Bue let me explain at the very outset that my main object 
in presenting these comments is to conuibute towards restricting 
the areas_ of misunderstanding which sometimes arise between the 
judicature and the psychiatrist. 
Problems of forensic psychiatry are the most complex because 
of the very nature of the field of study. For here we are concerned 
not with fi~ed anato~ical structures or physiological functions but 
with all the vagaries of human conduct and behaviour, both normal 
and abnormal. 
This is indeed a very vast subject which cannot be condensed in 
a brief introduction without creating mental confusion. It is for 
this reason that I have chosen just one of the most outstanding 
problems of forensic psychiatry which is the issue of insanity as a 
defence in criminal law. The legal issues -involved in determining 
responsibility, in convicting and in sentencing have corresponding 
medical issues in the diagnosis, care and treatment of the abnor-
mal offender and it is in this area that mutual understanding and 
cooperation between law and medicine present the greatest chal· 
lenge. 
Criminal Responsibility 
It is a fundamental doctrine of criminal law that if a man is sane 
he is responsible for his criminal acts and if insane he is not res· 
ponsible. In Malta this doctrine is enuen'ched in Sec. 34 of the Cri-
minal Code which states as follows: 'Every person is exempt from 
criminal responsibility if at the time of the act or omission -com· 
plained of such person (a) was in a state of insanity or frenzy.' 
This is in line .with the provisions of the Criminal Code of various 
European countries. Pasquale Tuozzi in his book 'Corso di Diritto 
Penale' traces the developmental stages of the concept of culpabi· 
lity and responsibility from the Sardinian Code of 1859 to the pre· 
sent Sec. 46 of the Italian Penal Code. The relevant section (Sec. 
94) in the Codice St11'do states: 'Non vi e reato se l'imputato tro· 
vasi in stato di assoluta imbecillita, di pazzia o di morboso furore 
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quando commise Pazione.' CThere is no criminal offence if the ac-
cused was in a state of complete imbecility, insanity or morbid . 
frenzy when he committed the act'). The corresponding section in 
our criminal code is practically identical with the Sardinian Code 
except that it did not include imbecility or mental subnormality as 
it is now known. According to Tuozzi this section in the Sardinian 
:ode was thought to be too restrictive in its application. The con-
cept was therefore expanded to embrace a wider category of abnor~ 
mal mental conditions and to define the terms in law which deter· 
mine responsibility. The present Sec. 46 of the Italian Penal Code 
states: 'Non e punibile colui che nel momento in cui ha commesso 
il fatto era in tale stato di infermita di mente da togliergli la co-
scienza o la li:berta dei propri atti.' (No person is liable to punish-
ment who at the time when he committed the act was in such a state 
of mental infirmity as to be deprived of consciousness or of free-
dom of action). The concept of 'Crifermica di mente' encompasses a 
vaster field than the concept of -insanity. The Italian code defines 
the two ingredients for determini-ng criminal responsibility namely 
intelligence, knowledge and awareness of the ace or omission and 
volition including freedom of choice. 
In Malta we have no legal definition of insanity or frenzy but the 
mental attributes which exempt a criminal offender from punishment 
are contained in Sec. 35 which deals with intoxication and was 
amended as recently as 1956 by Act 5 and now reads as follows: 
1lntoxication shall be a defence to any criminal charge if by rea-
son thereof the person charged at the time of the act or omission 
complained of was incapable of understanding and volition , etc. 
This makes the legal test of culpability and responsibility in Mal-
ta dependent on the same mental attributes applicable to the Ital-
ian and other European penal codes. 
In England the legal test of insanity is based on the McNaughten 
rules which state that in order to be acquitted of criminal respon-
sibility by reason of insanity it must be proved that the accused 
was suffering from a defect of reason due to disease of the mind 
such that (a) he did not know the nature and quality of his act 
(b) that he did not know that he was doing wrong - and the word 
1 wrong' in England means wrong in law and not morally wrong and, 
(c) that the disease of the mind resulted in a delusion which if 
true would have justified the accused doing what he did. 
The McNaughcen rules put all the emphasis on reason, know-
ledge and understanding of the nature of the act and of its illega-
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lity _and do not take into account the concept of volition or the im-
pairment of the ability to control conduct. Even t~e delusion 
clause depends on reason and understanding. The law accepts the 
delusion but requires the accused to reason about it as a sane 
man. As an American Judge put it, the prisoner must not only be 
mad but must use sufficient reason in his madness so as to tailor 
his criminal action to fit his delusion. It has been rightly said that 
nobody is hardly ever mad enough to be within the definition of the 
law (~aron Bramwell) and mos~ psychiatric offenders evaded con-
viction because the rules were stretched and interpreted in a cha-
ritable way. 
In comparatively recent times an attempt to break the rigid dis· 
tinction between McNaughten insanity and full responsibility had 
been made through the introduction of the doctrine of the Irresis· 
tible Impulse .and that of Diminished Responsibility. In r;na~y Ame-
rican states as well as in Scotland the right or wrong test of the 
McNaughten rules has been supplemented by the doctrine of the Ir· 
resistible Impulse which is based on the assumption that men can 
make a deliberate choice to. act or refrain from acting but that in-
sanity can give rise to impulses which cannot be resisted; but 
whether an impulse is truly irresistible or has not been resisted 
cannot be scientificaUy proved. It is not a distinction that anybody 
can ·make about anybody else. 
English law does not recognise the irresistible impulse as a de-
fence. The passing ·of the Homicide Act 1957 however introduced 
the doctrine of diminished responsibility and Sec. 2 of the act re· 
duces guilt from one of murder to manslaughter if an abnormality of 
the mind substantially impairs the accused's responsibility for his 
acts. 
Legal and medical concepts of mental disorder 
The legal concept of mental disorder is at variance with .modern 
psychological and psychiatric concepts and the attempts to keep 
notions of culpability in step with the growth of medical knowledge 
does not seem to have produced the desired result. 
In practice there are two fundamental ·issues in which psychiatry 
cannot satisfy the demands of legal principles governing culpabi· 
lity and responsibility. One is the concept which views individual 
characteristics as falling into distinct classes rather than contin· 
uous scales, and the other is the concept which views the mind as 
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composed of separate and distinct functions or faculties rather 
than a number of interdependent ones. 
In psychiatry, as in all biological sciences we learn to think in 
terms of continuous scales rather than clear cut classes. In all bio-
logical variables ·there is a continuum between two extremes. We 
do not classify human beings on an either/or basis as tall or short, 
thin or fat, idiots or geniuses, sane or insane. Just as th.ere is a 
continuous scale for height and a continuous scale for weight so 
one finds all shades and gradations from idiocy at one extreme to 
genius at the other and from the we~l adjusted to the raying psy-
chotic. Some psychiatrists have in fact today come out with the 
theory of a continuum of deviation from a normality which shades 
gradually into psychoneuroses and psychoneurosis shading grad-
ually into psychosis. 
The law in its doctrine of criminal responsibility shows little 
respect for chis concept of a continuum of deviation. The tradi-
tional legal view works in terms of black or white whereas as one 
author puts it 'the minds of men are shades of grey.' Indeed one of 
the most frustrating experiences of many expert witnesses is that 
court officials demand impossible yes or no answers to their ques-
tions and ignore all the uncertainties and all the ambiguities of be'-
haviour which we as psychiatrists have learned to accept in prac-
tice. 
Today _it is well recognised that there is no clear-cut line bet-
ween the legally sane and the legally insane. Between these two 
extremes there are many so called twilight conditions which are not 
serious enough for an accused to be acquitted of criminal respon-
sibility under the present tests nor to require that he be indetermin-
ately confined to a mental hospital, but which at the same time 
render him incapable of sound and calm judgement. All of us who 
have acted under conditions of emotional stress know how foolish 
our actions appeared when seen in retrospect. Certain criminal of· 
fences are committed under the stress of emotional tension when 
forces are unleashed which under normal conditions are inhibited 
or at least damped down. Thanks to Freud even the man in the 
street now knows that we often ace for reasons which we do not 
understand. Persons with hysterical personalities are particularly 
prone to these twilight states (when they are apt co go on a fugue, 
in a state of dissociation) when their behaviour becomes dominat-
ed by unconscious forces but cannot in all fairness be said to sa-
tisfy the legal tests of insanity even if we were to butcher the facts 
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to fit the theory. 
One other concept in which criminal law and modem psychiatric 
thinking have drifted apart is that contained in the theory of dis-
tinct faculties of the mind functioning independently. This is a~ 
parently derived from the theory of phrenology when it was believ-
ed that each function of the mind had its own water tight compart· 
ment in the brain with its respective bump on the skull. ·one still 
hears talk in legal circles of partial delusion or par~ial insanity or 
monomania. In psychiatry we do not recognise such conditions. 
The mind works as a whole and a delusion is a symptom of a di-
sease affecting all aspects of mental life. We cannot divorce cog· 
nition from affection and con at ion as the McN aughteri rules would 
have us do. The idea that part of the mind can be diseased while 
the rest is completely normal is pure legal fiction. A mental ill-
ness interferes with the patient's thought, feeling and conduct, and 
brings about a breakdown in the harmonious psychological connec-
tions and a disorganization of the personality as a whole. Intellect, 
feeling and striving are constantly interacting between themselves 
and the ~nvironment to produce the behaviour we know and in our 
assessment of this behaviour we must take stock of all this inter-
action. A mother, who in the abyss of a melancholic illness kills 
her .new born baby, knows what she is doing and that it is against 
the law to do so but her thoughts and her judgement are influenced 
by the outlook of hopelessness and despair which a severe depres-
sion brings into her mental life. In fact Sec. 258A of the Maltese 
Criminal Code changes such a crime from one of wilful homicide 
to one of infanticide liable to imprisonment for a term not exceed-
ing 20 years. This section conforms to the doctrine of diminished 
responsibility of many continental countries and accepts a degree 
of mental disorder which comes between sanity and insanity. The 
law is apparently recognizing what has .been accepted teaching in 
psychiatry for a long time now. But this recognition is apparently 
limited · in Malta to cases of infanticfde only. The doctrine of di-
minished responsibility has not received general acceptance in the 
Maltese criminal code notwithstanding that a proposal for the in-
troduction of limited responsibility was twice made in the Council 
of Government first by Sir Adrian Dingli in 1850 and then by Sir 
Arthur Mercieca in 1909. 
Pleading and court procedure 
From the somewhat academic concepts of insanity at law I would 
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ow like to pass on to the more practical considerations of the me· 
ico-legal procedures involved in criminal tria~s where the plea of 
1sani ty is raised. 
In Malta this plea can be raised either by the prosecution or by 
he defence and iri cases where the plea is supported, the Court 
;ends the accused for a period of observation at Mount Carmel Hos-
ital and appoints one or more medical experts, (usually three), to 
:ubmit a written report on the mental state of the accused during 
he time of the alleged offence and during the trial. In the case of 
~ex vs Giuseppe Cauchi determined on 24th September, .1942, rules 
rere given by the Court for the guidance of medical experts where 
le issue of insanity was referred to them. One of the recommenda-
ions made by the Court states that 'A regular proces verbal of 
he interrogatory of the patient, when made by the experts, should 
.e kept and filed together with the report.' In an explanatory note 
n this rule Judge Harding states: 'It would appear that the result 
1f the interrogatory is a very important consideration in guiding 
'.le experts to their conclusions. It seems proper that some sort of 
:ontrol be made possible by the keeping of a process verbal and 
le filing thereof with the report.' 
This rule runs counter to ordinary psychiatric practice of history 
aking and psychiatric examination in which the patient submits in-
)rmation willingly in an atmosphere of crust and confidence in his 
•hysiciao. In examining a Court patient the psychiatrist is con· 
erned solely with arriving at a fair opinion of the accused's state 
f mind at the time of the alleged crime and at the time of the trial. 
le is not concerned with determining innocence or guilt. But if 
his rule were to be strictly applied one would have to warn the 
ccused that anything he says would have to be filed in the report 
) the Court. This would very likely give rise to an atmosphere of 
.uspicion and mistrust which in the case of a patient with paranoid 
~ends would often end up compelling him to remain mute and un· 
esponsive. In ordinary psychiatric practice one is already handi· 
apped by the problem of establishing rapport with some patients. 
Jut how can you communicate meaningfully with someone who sees 
ou as pare of the oppressing establishment when you warn him 
2at anything he says may be repeated in Court? 
As the psychiatric interview is essential for a psychiatric referee 
) form a sound opinion of a person's mental condition and as this 
annot be had if the patient refuses to talk, it would appear that if 
tis rule is insisted upon it is likely to defeat its own ends. There 
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are, of course, other considerations emanating from the defendant's 
constitutional privilege not to be a witness against himself. It 
seems that the objections to this rule of procedure have not so far 
been given their due weight .. 
In accordance with present laws of criminal procedure applic-
able in Malta as in many other countries, any allegation of insani-
ty shall first be determined by a jury whose members are not bound 
to accept the findings of the referees. This raises a point of prin-
ciple of great importance and one which appears to be at variance 
with the principles of expert evidence applicable to medical or 
surgical -cases. No court of law would accept the testimony of a 
group of laymen as to whether a person was affected with heart di-
sease, ruber.culosis or cancer. Why therefore should there be a dif-
ferent rule regarding mental disorders? Why indeed are laymen with 
no special knowledge or experience of mental illness ever qualif-
ied to express an opinion on the sanity or insanity of another per-
son? How, may one ask, can nine men selected at random be as-
sumed to be capable of conceiving the intricate elements of psy-
chiatric disorder and form an opinion, based on one fact without 
having examined or observed the patient for any length of time? In-
sanity, whether in law or in psychiatry is a condition of the mirid 
and not a mere lack of self control; it cannot be recog-nised from 
any one act however atrocious, anti-social or impulsive it happens 
to be. The process of establishing a clinical diagnosis of·insanity 
is similar to that of constructing the picture of a jig-saw puzzle. 
The pieces acquire meaning only if they fit together into a cohe-
rent whole, but one piece by itself is absolutely meaningless. 
With this situation we have to consider not only the risks in-
volved in condemning a sick man but also the risk of sending a 
sane person to pass the rest of his life within the strict custody 
imposed on insane offenders. This is as terrible a punishment as 
any known in the annals of the martyrdom of man. As one author 
mildly puts it cTo have a sane man found insane may be a forensic 
triumph but it has little else to commend it.' To my mind such a 
finding would impose a change in the role of the hospital from one 
of care and treatment to o~e of custody and detention and a change 
in the role of its staff from one. of doctors and nurses to that of 
white coated jailers. .. 
These remarks are meant to highlight the difficulties of the jury 
verdict of sanity or insanity and the heavy responsibility which 
lies with their decision. It has to be admitted however that although 
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the system may at times fail to attain the good intentions of the 
legislator no better alternative is yet in sight. The last word on 
the question of criminal responsibility must rest with the law. 
Methods of disposal 
From conviction we now pass on to sentencing and it is here 
that cooperation between law and medicine is most important. Un-
fortunately in Malta this is the area in which we lag far behind 
other c.ountries. The most serious weakness in our system is in 
my opinion, the lack of flexibility in the disposal of the accused 
found to be insane. This disposal is prescribed in Sec. 619 of the 
Maltese Criminal Code where it is stated that if the accused is 
~ound to be insane the Court shall order the accused to be kept in 
strict custody in Mount Carmel Hospital and shall cause infonna-
:ion thereof to be forthwith conveyed to the Governor who will give 
such directions as he may deem fit for the care and custody of 
;uch insane person. 
In practice this amounts veey often to an indecermin~te sentence 
ll.Od is applicable not only to major crimes but also to minor of-
:ences; so that if insane behaviour finds expression in petty thefts 
>r in taking unauthorized j~y rides or in any other form of minor 
lelinquency the offender may be sent to hospital for the same in-
iefinite period as in the case of the patient who has maimed or 
~lled. There is apparently no provision in our legislation to en-
Lble the judge or magistrate to obtain the experts' opinion on the 
nost appropriate psychiatric disposal. Neither is there· any provi· 
;ion to ascertain that facilities for treatment are available or that 
:he condition from which the accused is suffering is susceptible 
·o medical treatment or should better be dealt with within the pe-
1al system. In my experience once the jury's verdict of insanity 
s given the accused is invariably dealt with in .accordance with 
iec. 619. 
Ia many developed countries with progressive mental health le-
~islation a number of possibilities are open to the court after sen-
encing. In England for example, according to the Court's assess-
!lent of the case, an abnormal offender may be dealt with in seve· 
al ways: 
I. As in Malta he may be compulsorily admitted to hospital with 
l restriction order on discharge - deten tioa being for an indefinite 
•eriod unless overruled by the Secretary of State; 
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2. He may be compulsorily admitted to hospital without any res-
uiction on discharge - discharge is detennined by the responsible 
medical officer in much the same way as that of a certified patient; 
3 • .He may be admitted to guardianship of relatives or others; 
4. He may be put on probation and required to undergo treatment; 
S. He may be conditionally or absolutely discharged if he ag-
rees to receive treatment voluntarily either as in-patient or out-pa-
tient. 
6. He may be made subject to normal penal sentence such as 
imprisonment or fine. 
This las.t provision may sound harsh and unorthodox when ap-
plied to abnormal offenders but I ~ould like to. go back to the con-
cept of continuous scales mentioned previously and emphasize the 
fact that abnormal of fenders cannot be classified into the two ca· 
tegories of the utterly irresppnsible and the fully responsible. 
Apart from those who suffer from seve ri:; psychiatric disorders the 
majority of offenders retain some element of responsibility and al-
though medic.al treatment is necessary during overtly unstable 
phases, discipline and character training still have a role to play. 
This applies particularly to severe forms of psychopathic perso-
nalities whose main symptom is .violence in an apparently nonnal 
person. They are unlikely to benefit by any kind of mental hospital 
treatment because their needs are different. Indeed in the conven-
tional mental hospital they receive no treatment - they are admit-
ted solely for board and lodging, they become a nuisance and a 
danger to other patients, monopolize the staff's attention and pre· 
vent the development of therapeutic community attitudes. You do 
not admit a criminal psychopath to a conventional mental hospital 
for the same reason that you do not admit a patient with smallpox 
to the general hospital. In most countries they are cared for in 
special hospitals or in special units in prisons known as prison 
hospitals. 
It is because of such considerations that measures have been 
introduced in most courts abroad to enable them to obtain further 
information so as to assess whether the condition is susceptible 
to medical treatment or whether the · hospital has facilities for 
dealing with serious criminal propensities. In the modem mental 
hospital where the milieu has been freed from the old restrictions, 
the requirements of this type of patient are at variance with those 
of the majority. This being the case, it is advisable in Malta in or-
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der not to restrict the many because of the needs. of the few, to 
provide a special unit in the form of a small prison hospital where 
th~ needs of the criminal patient could be adequately met. How-
ever, for the courts to continue to commit to conventional hospi-
tals such offenders whose abnormal behaviour constitutes a real 
~reat to other patients and staff is unrealistic, to say the least. 
I would like to conclude with a .plea to all my legal and medical 
colleagues not to allow my list of shortcomings and criticisms to 
overshadow my praise and admiration for the way in which justice 
is done and is seen to be done in the Maltese Courts of Law. 
CIVIL PARTNERSHIPS AND 
JURIDICAL PERSONALITY 
Gtnoo SALIBA 
IN regulating Civil Partnerships the Maltese legislator certainly 
did not intend conferring on them legal personality. This can be 
concluded by reference to Italian law of the same period i.e.- the 
Civil Cod~ of 1865, and by analogy from a consideration of the his· 
torical aspects of the question in the case of commercial partner-
ships. 
Before examining the status of civil partnership in the Italian 
Civil Code it may be apposite to explore the antecedents of the de-
finition of the contract of partnership contained in Sec. 1738 of our 
Civil Code - originally Art. 1404 of Ord. VII of 1868. 
Partnership is a contract whereby two or more persons agree to 
place a thing in common, with a view to sharing the benefit 
which may derive therefrom. 
This is basically the same definition as that of the Roman so-
cietas, as indeed is the notion of civil partnerships in practically 
all continental codes including the English Partnership Act of 
1890. Under Roman Law the societas was c~nsidered to be a con-
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